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Abstract - This paper investigates the relationship between
incentives, information and winner’s curse in the bidding for
construction industry contracts.  The approach uses both simple
Monte Carlo simulations and bidding experiments to show the
effects of changing levels of information (in terms of variance)
and incentive (in terms of risk share) on the winner’s curse.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper ties together three distinct and rich areas of
bidding literature that are important to the understanding and
dealing with these uncertainties: Incentive Contracts,
Information and winner’s curse.
This investigation was conducted using both simple Monte
Carlo simulations and student bidding experiments. Student
experiments were performed using seniors and graduate
students in Civil Engineering at Portland State University.
Both the simulations and the experiments were designed to
investigate the relationship between varying levels of
information available to bidders, the ensuing aggressiveness of
the bidding (resulting in a winner’s curse) and the effect of
increasing the share of risk to the Owner.
A. A Brief Review of Auction and Bidding Theory
There are many surveys of auction theory in the operations
research, management science and economics literature.  Some
of the more complete include [8, 18, 23, 34].
An auction is an economic institution designed for the
exchange of goods or services, where the exact selling or
purchase price of the good or service is unknown prior to the
auction.  The price of the exchange is established by bidding
among parties wishing to either purchase or sell the good or
service.  Types of auctions are distinguished by the rules
determined by the bid-taker.  The various auction types in
general use can be classified by following characteristics:
highest or lowest bid, first or second price, private or common
value, in combination with open (often oral) or closed
(typically sealed) bidding.  This paper is concerned with the
most common form of bidding used in the construction
industry, lowest bid, first price, common value, closed or
sealed bid auctions [26].
B. First Price, Common Value, Sealed Bid Auctions
Construction bidding is generally considered and
modeled as a first price, common value, sealed bid auctions.
First price and sealed bid are rules set by the bid-taker and in
the public sector, are often set by law in the jurisdiction where
the bidding is taking place.  Common value relates to the prize
for winning the contest. Construction projects are generally
modeled as common value auctions due to the fact that, within
certain limits, the costs of the work to be accomplished is the
same for any bidder.  This assumption has been questioned
however [7].
The information available to bidders (and bid-takers) is
another variable that should be included in any bidding model.
That is, the bidders can be valuing the object based on equal
albeit uncertain information or one or more bidders can
possess significantly more information than the other bidders.
In construction bidding, we generally assume symmetric but
uncertain information regarding the value of the project is
available to all prospective bidders.
C.Incentive Contract Bidding
An incentive contract or incentive contract bidding, is an
attempt to design an auction where risk can be shared
adequately and rationally between the bid-taker and the
winning bidder.  Without such a vehicle, the bidder has a great
inducement to hedge against cost uncertainty [27].  This topic
of research has produced a rich source of published analysis
and discussion ranging from economic theory to case study
analysis [1, 5, 6, 12, 19, 21, 28, 31, 33]. The basic incentive
contract formulation as given by [21]:
pi
 = αp + β(p - C) (1)
Where pi is the profit to the contractor, α is a profit rate
anticipated by the contractor, p is the bid price, β is the risk
share between the bidder (0≤ β ≤ 1.0) and bid-taker and C is
the actual cost after final accounting.  In this formulation, the
contractor’s profit would be exactly equal to the “target profit”
at bid time (pi = αp) if his bid price equals the final cost.  If the
final costs are less than bid, the contractor receives, β(p - C)
additional profits.  If the cost exceeds the bid the contractor
loses β(p - C).
Several other authors have proposed variations on this
formula.  For the purpose of this paper, we will define the
incentive contract formula in terms of the total cost to the bid-
taker (generally the owner) as follows:
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T(c) = αCbid + Cbid +  β( Cactual – Cbid)      (2)
Where, α is the bidder’s mark-up rate (a common method
for deriving a value for the bidder’s profit, overhead and other
non-cost-of-work related costs). Cbid and Cactual are the
estimated cost of the work at bid time and the actual cost of the
work determined by a final accounting at project’s end
respectively (C and p above).  From equation (2) we see that
the bid-taker’s financial risk in the case of cost over-run and
gain in the case of under-run, are equal to the risk–share
variable times the difference between bid and actual costs.
D.  Winner’s Curse
The analysis of winner’s curse was first brought into the
literature by Capen, Clapp and Campbell [3] in their review of
high risk outer continental shelf oil and gas lease auctions.
They conclude that, “In competitive bidding, the winner tends
to be the player who most ever estimates true tract value.”
They go on to show that the “law of averages” simply doesn’t
apply in common value competitive bidding, because with a
sufficient number of bidders, any bidder only wins if he or she
over-values the item sought and in every bidding situation,
some bidder will over-value the item.  Which implies that
competitive bidding must, over the long run, result in
substantial financial losses in those industries where it is
practiced.
Winner’s curse has spawned a significant amount
research, analyzing it’s existence, predicting it’s magnitude
and guarding against it [3, 10, 16, 17, 24, 29, 30].  Winner’s
curse in the construction industry has been studied in [4, 7,
32].
Most of the work to date on winner’s curse has focused
on the bidder’s perspective as opposed to the bid-taker.  Here,
we show the effect of the changing risk-sharing variable on
winner’s curse, a rule that is fully within the discretion of the
bid-taker.
E. Information
A rich body of literature concerned both, directly and
indirectly with its relationship to competitive bidding has been
established.  Much of this work is concerned with the analysis
of symmetric versus asymmetric information and principal
agent asymmetries [9, 11, 13, 25]. Information as it relates to
winner’s curse is discussed in [15]. [22] and [14] present
information use in case studies of timber contracts bidding.
Here, we treat information somewhat differently.  For the
purposes of this paper, we equate the amount of information
available to a bidder to be represented by the standard
deviation of the continuous distribution of possible prices. Our
purpose in equating the amount of information available to the
bidder (and bid-taker) to the breadth of the distribution is to
recognize that information is directly related to the range of
possible prices.  Complete, or 100% information should yield
virtually zero variance in prices from bidders, whereas no
information, 0%, should yield an infinitely large standard
deviation.  Recognizing also however, that information is
always greater than zero (since we know a project exists in
order to bid on it) and less than complete (due to unpredictable
variables such as weather.)
II. BIDDING SIMULATION STUDY
The bidding simulation is performed to test the effect of
varying the amount of project information as depicted by the
standard deviation of the input distributions for the project and
the bidders against the risk sharing variable and mark-up.
Here also, we provide a theoretical basis of comparison for
the experimental data and test certain assumptions of the
bidding environment.
A. Model Description
The bidding simulation portion of this study was conducted
using an electronic spreadsheet to generate bids and actual
costs.  This process is substantially similar to an example
found in [2].  In the simulation, quasi-random variates were
generated for five bidders.  Bid costs (“Cbid” in the model) for
each are calculated based on the input mean and standard
deviation for the given “project.”  The lowest of the five
bidders is selected and compared with a similarly generated
“cost” (“Cactual” in the model) for each “project.”
In addition to the two cost parameters (bid cost, “Cbid” and
project cost, “Cactual”) generated above, a third parameter,
“mark-up” (“αCbid” in the model) is included in the simulation
model.  Recall from Section I, the incentive formula:
T(CBid-taker) = αCbid + (1-β) Cbid + β Cactual. (2)
In the simulation, we keep the mean value of the project
constant at “300,” then vary the standard deviation from “30”
(or ten percent) to “180” (or sixty percent).  This simulates a
decreasing amount of information about the project to all
bidders.  The share of savings variable, β, is varied from 0
(lump sum) to 1.00 (cost plus).
Finally, knowing that construction contractors, like all
businesses, are profit seekers, we assume that over time they
will adjust their mark-up (αCbid) to cover any average
anticipated loss or winner’s curse.  Therefore, mark-up for
each bid was calculated for the break-even point for each
winning bid.
The input distribution used for this analysis was the normal
distribution.  However, the normal distribution for this
simulation does have significant drawbacks and limitations
and it is important to understand and account for these
limitations.
The assumption of normality has been challenged by several
researchers including, [20] and indirectly by [19].  One study
[20], was able to reject the hypothesis of normality for
modeling roadway projects.   However, for building projects
they found “the distributions of prices tendered are well
modeled by normal distributions.”
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B. Scenario’s Simulated
Three different types of scenario’s were simulated: 1)
where the means and standard deviations of the bidders
estimated costs (Cbid) and the projects actual cost (Cactual) were
equal but vary.  2) Where the standard deviation of Cbid
remained constant, while the standard deviation of Cactual
varied.  And 3) where the standard deviation of Cactual
remained constant, while the standard deviation of Cbid varied.
C.Results and Discussion
Typical results from the different scenario types are
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Fig. 2. Scenario 2: σCbid  held constant, σCactual varies
The graphics presented above for Scenario’s 2 and 3 are
“typical” for these scenario types.  Simulations were run
keeping the standard deviations of one variable (Cbid in
Scenario 2 and Cactual in Scenario 3) constant while the other
varied from a standard deviation of 30 to 180.  The graphics
above are for simulations where the constant value is held at a
standard deviation of 90, however, the results are substantially
similar for all constant values simulated (also 30 to 180).
The graphics indicate the increase in winner’s curse, as
measured by the percent mark-up (α, of αCbid in our model)
for the different standard deviations of the x-axis variable(s).
The different lines graphed indicate different levels of risk
share (β), beginning at the bottom of each Fig. with a β=0.90
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Fig. 3. Scenario 3: σCactual  constant, σCbid  varies
and proceeding up in order, 0.75, 0.50, 0.25, 0.10 and 0.0.
The data for cost-plus, or β=1.0 is not graphed because it
would simply equal zero for all values.
The results indicate that winner’s curse and subsequently,
mark-up, in the presence of constant risk share, are most
sensitive to the standard deviation of the bidder’s estimated
costs (Cbid).  This is indicated most graphically in Scenario 3,
(Fig. 4) which represents a constant variability in the actual
cost and increasing variability in the bidders estimated cost.
These conditions might occur when the an owner creates
variability in actual costs outside of the actual scope of work,
while offering the contractor varying levels of information
reflected in changing standard deviations of Cbid.  From Fig. 4
we conclude that as information becomes less reliable (that is,
as the standard deviation of Cbid increases), the owner must
increase the risk sharing variable to keep winner’s curse and
subsequent bidder mark-up within reasonable levels.
Fig. 3 is characteristic of common and constant variability
in Cbid, while Cactual’s variability is allowed to increase.  This
might be interpreted as a relatively well-defined (or at least
commonly defined) project scope, but ill defined owner
management practices which lead to highly variable costs.  In
this case, the risk sharing variable defines the winner’s curse
and sets the contractor’s required mark-up for various levels
of bidder variability.  (Fig. 3 depicts a bidder variability or
standard deviation of 90.  For smaller standard deviations, the
effect is less pronounced and the opposite is true also.)
Our analysis of Fig.’s 3 and 4 lead us to conclude the
primary cause for the shape of the graphs in Fig. 2 are owing
to the effects discussed for Fig. 4.  That is, the changing
variability in Cbid, which reflects differences in information
offered the bidders.
The weakness of our normality assumption observed earlier
would be expected to aggravate the winner’s curse effect in
these simulations. Our empirical study found that real
contractor bids were more closely distributed about the mean
than the normal function would have predicted.  Therefore, we
would not expect as many low bids as were generated by the
simulation.  However, we would expect actual data to take the
same general shape as the curves depicted in Fig.’s 2 and 4.
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III. BIDDING GAME
An experiment was performed to simulate the construction-
bidding environment with varying amounts of information and
changing risk sharing.  Seniors and graduate students enrolled
in the Civil Engineering department at Portland State
University performed the experiment.
A. Description
This experiment consisted of twelve successive bids for
jars of candies.  Students were given an opportunity to
examine each jar prior to the start of bidding.  They were told
that the jars contained a number of candies drawn from one of
three random normal distributions.  Each distribution had a
mean of 300 and one of three standard deviations (σ).  Each
bid was conducted under one of four risk-sharing rates (β’s).
The following table shows which β and σ applies to each bid,
by number.
TABLE I
σ = 100 σ = 50 σ = 25
β  = 0.00 Bid 1 Bid 2 Bid 3
β  = 0.25 Bid 4 Bid 5 Bid 6
β  = 0.50 Bid 7 Bid 8 Bid 9
β  = 0.75 Bid 10 Bid 11 Bid 12
Each bidder was asked to estimate and bid both Cbid and
αCbid.  After each student completed his or her bid, the lowest
bids were announced and read aloud.  Next, the actual amount
of candies (Cactual) for that jar was revealed.  Each bidder then
calculated his actual profit or loss based on equation (2).  The
lowest non-zero bid was awarded a small bag of candies (not
the jar full, however).  It is assumed that bids that result in
losses greater than the bid fee, αCbid, would be pulled before
consummating a contract.   Bids proceeded in order from 1 to
12.
B. Results
The students were inexperienced bidders but relatively fast
learners.  The students, on average, underestimated Cactual on
every bid.  The lowest bidder underestimated Cactual by 183 on
average and suffered losses on average of 45.7 (meaning that,
on average, the low bidder was forced to pull his or her bid).
As bidding progressed students learned that as the risk share
increased, that the estimated cost became less significant.  This
in-turn caused bidding to become more aggressive (meaning
lower bids) as the share of savings variable increased, as
shown below:
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Fig. 4. Averaged estimated cost bids and actual costs for each level of risk
share: beta (β).
Interestingly, the student bidding more closely resembled a
normal distribution than did the empirical study of real bids.
However, the student bids did exhibit the same central
tendency, as did the actual construction bids, just not as
pronounced.  Checking for normality again we were similarly
able to reject the normality hypothesis.
C.Discussion
This experiment was designed to test bidders response to
changing levels of information (as represented by standard
deviations) and risk (as represented by β’s.)  There were two
principal drawbacks to this experiment, and in particular
choice of participants: (1) the relative lack of experience or
knowledge of bidding, and (2) the relative complexity of the
game.  In spite of these drawbacks, the students performed
substantially as we would have predicted, given the outcome
of the simulated bidding contests.
Students consistently underestimated the actual cost.  This
was particularly evident among the lowest bidders.  An
average of the lowest ten bidders for each bid shows a clear
pattern of consistent underestimating.
One effect that was perhaps not predicted from the
simulation data was game competition aspect of the bid.  Note
in both Fig.’s 5 and 6, the reduced estimated costs for bids 11
and 12 (both β’s = 0.75).  This occurred when some bidders
realized that they could bid the minimum possible value for
Cactual, based on the given distributions 1, then adjust their fee
to compensate for the difference in costs times the risk share,
β.   For instance, when β = 0.75, the bidder knows he only
suffers 25% of the difference between estimated and actual
costs.  Knowing that the minimum possible cost is 2σ below
the mean and the maximum is 2σ above the mean, the bidder
can be assured of positive profits if his fee exceeds σ (0.25 *
4σ.)  The game then becomes estimating the maximum
                                                          
1
 Students were given the actual distribution of all Cactual’s for each of the three
distributions.
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anticipated actual cost, based on the amount of risk the bidder
is willing to accept. The effect on the bidding was to increase
fees while simultaneously decreasing estimated costs.
However, as we may have expected, the bidding, due mainly
to the reduction in estimated costs, became more aggressive as
time went on and bidder risk decreased as share of savings
increased
IV. SUMMARY
This paper investigated the relationship between three
important areas of competitive bidding: incentives,
information and winner’s curse.  The study included both
Monte Carlo simulations and bidding experiments.  We found
a number of relationships that exist between amount of
information available to bidders (in the form of standard
deviation of the estimates) and winner’s curse.  As the amount
and or quality of information becomes less reliable,

















Ten Lowest Est Cost Actual Costs
Fig. 5. Ten lowest bidders Averaged Estimated Cost Bids and Actual Costs
for each Bid, by Bid Number.
 the magnitude of mark-up required to off-set the winner’s
curse increases, and that this relationship is not linear.
We find that, winner’s curse is most sensitive to the
information offered the bidder.  And, if the amount or quality
of information is not controllable by the bid-taker, then the
bid-taker can control the magnitude of winner’s curse and
resulting mark-up by increasing the risk sharing variable.
The student bidding experiments did perform much our
simulations had predicted.  One significant deviation from the
expected behavior occurred toward the end of the experiment.
Some bidders started to better understand the rules of the game
as risk share increased to 75% for the owner.  Under these
conditions in the last several bids, the winning bidders
reduced their estimated costs to the minimum possible then
covered the anticipated difference between estimated and
actual cost by increasing their fee.  The lower the anticipated
actual cost, the lower the fee required is.  This differs from the
normal bidding process which seeks to minimize the difference
between actual and estimated costs and minimize the fee in
order to reduce the overall bid.
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